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Abstract
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A
(single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoﬀ distribution to every TU-game. A
well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure
describes a situation in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered
in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they
are allowed to cooperate. The corresponding restricted game takes account of the limited
cooperation possibilities by assigning to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible
subset. In this paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus
of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with permission structure.
Keywords: TU-game, nucleolus, game with permission structure, peer group game, in-
formation market game, algorithm, complexity.
AMS subject classification: 91A12, 5C20
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game is a ﬁnite set of players
and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoﬀ that the
coalition can obtain by cooperating. A payoﬀ vector is a vector which gives a payoﬀ to
each of the players, i.e., each component corresponds to precisely one of the players. A
payoﬀ vector is eﬃcient if the sum of the payoﬀs is equal to the worth of the grand coalition
of all players. A set-valued solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoﬀ vectors (possibly
empty) to every TU-game. A single-valued solution assigns precisely one payoﬀ vector
to every TU-game. A solution is said to be eﬃcient if for every game any payoﬀ vector
assigned by the solution is eﬃcient. The most well-known eﬃcient set-valued solution is
the Core (Gillies, 1953). The two most well-known eﬃcient single-valued solutions are the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of some hierarchical
structure that is represented by a directed graph such that some players need permission
from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. In the literature
two approaches to these games with a permission structure can be found. In the conjunctive
approach, as considered in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996), it is
assumed that each player needs permission from all its predecessors in the directed graph
before it is allowed to cooperate. Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach as developed in
Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), a player needs permission to cooperate
of at least one of its direct predecessors (if it has any). So, according to the conjunctive
approach a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition it holds that
all its predecessors are also in the coalition, whereas according to the disjunctive approach
a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition at least one of its
predecessors (if it has any) is also in the coalition. Following an approach similar to that
of Myerson (1977) for games with limited communication (graph) structure, in both the
conjunctive and disjunctive approach to games with a permission structure a restricted
game is derived. In games with permission structure the restricted game assigns to every
coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. Applying well-known solutions as the
Shapley value, Core or nucleolus to such restricted games yields solutions for games with
a permission structure.
A special subclass of games with a permission structure arises from peer group situ-
ations, as introduced in Braˆnzei et al. (2002). A peer group situation is a triple consisting
of a set of players, a hierarchical structure represented by a rooted directed tree, and for
each player a real number representing his potential individual (economic) contribution
to the society of all players. This yields an associated TU-game being the additive game
in which the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum of the individual potentials of its
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members. In a rooted directed tree there is one top node (not having a predecessor), while
any other node has precisely one predecessor. So, in case the hierarchical structure on the
player set is a rooted directed tree, the conjunctive approach and the disjunctive approach
as described above, coincide. The restricted game of the associated TU-game with respect
to such a permission structure is called a peer group game . These peer group games have
many interesting applications, see Braˆnzei et al. (2002). Clearly, in a peer group game the
worth of a coalition is the sum of the individual potentials of the members of the largest
feasible subset of the coalition. Since the top player is always in this set when he belongs to
the coalition, and the largest feasible set is the empty set for any coalition not containing
the unique top player, it follows that the top player is a veto player, i.e., any coalition not
containing the (veto) top player has zero worth in the restricted game.
In Arin and Feltkamp (1997) an exponential time algorithm has been given to com-
pute the nucleolus for veto-rich games. In Braˆnzei et al. (2005) a polynomial time algo-
rithm is given to compute the nucleolus of a peer group game. In this paper we modify
the Arin-Feltkamp algorithm to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game induced by
more general situations, including peer group situations and information market situations
(see Muto et al. (1989)) as special cases. The generalization concerns both the hierarchical
graph structure and the class of unrestricted TU-games by allowing for any digraph having
one top node and no directed cycles and any game satisfying a so-called weak digraph
monotonicity condition and a weak digraph concavity condition. The algorithm ﬁnds the
nucleolus in polynomial time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section containing
cooperative TU-games (with special attention for the nucleolus), directed graphs and games
with a permission structure. In section 3 we introduce the properties of weak digraph
monotonicity and weak digraph concavity and we present some examples satisfying these
conditions. In Section 4 we present some properties of essential and feasible coalitions.
These properties are crucial for the algorithm given in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss
the complexity of the algorithm. Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair
(N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a ﬁnite set of n players and v: 2N → R is a characteristic function
on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e.,
the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. For
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simplicity, for a single player i we denote its worth v({i}) by v(i). We denote the collection
of all characteristic functions on N by GN . A TU-game (N, v) is monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T )
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . It is convex (concave) if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ (≥)v(S ∩ T )+ v(S ∪ T ) for all
S, T ⊆ N .
A payoﬀ vector is a vector x ∈ IRn assigning a payoﬀ xi to every i ∈ N . In the
sequel, for S ⊆ N we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. A payoﬀ vector is eﬃcient if x(N) = v(N)
and it is individually rational if xi ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N . The imputation set I(N, v) of
game v is given by
I(N, v) = {x ∈ Rn|x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N},
i.e., I(N, v) is the set of all eﬃcient and individually rational payoﬀ vectors. A (set-valued)
solution F on GN assigns a set F (N, v) ⊂ Rn of payoﬀ vectors to every characteristic
function v ∈ GN . The most well-known set-valued solution is the Core assigning to every
v ∈ GN the set
C(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N},
i.e., it is the set of all imputations that are stable in the sense that no coalition can do
better by separating from the grand coalition. The Core of (N, v) is non-empty if and
only if the game is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva (1962) or Shapley (1967). A collection
B = {S1, . . . , Sm} of subsets of N is said to be a balanced collection when the system of
equations
m∑
j=1
λje
Sj = eN (2.1)
has a unique positive solution, denoted by λBj , j = 1, . . . ,m, where, for S ⊆ N , the n-vector
eS is given by eSi = 1 when i ∈ S and e
S
i = 0 otherwise. A game (N, v) is balanced if
m∑
j=1
λBj v(Sj) ≤ v(N)
for any balanced collection B = {S1, . . . , Sm}.
Another (set-valued) solution is the Kernel assigning to every v ∈ GN the set
K(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v)| [sij(x) = sji(x)] or [sij(x) > sji(x) and xj = v(j)] for all i, j ∈ N},
i.e., the set of all imputations such that for each pair of players i and j the complaint
sij(x) = max{v(S)− x(S) | i ∈ S, j ∈ S} of i against j is at least equal to the complaint
of j against i, with equality whenever j gets more than its individual worth v(j).
A solution F is said to be single-valued if it assigns to any v ∈ GN a unique payoﬀ
vector. The two most well-known single-valued solutions are the Shapley value (Shapley,
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1953) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). Since the aim of this paper is to give an
algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a special class of characteristic functions, we
devote the next subsection to this solution.
2.2 Nucleolus
Consider a given a characteristic function v ∈ GN , and payoﬀ vector x ∈ IRn. Then the
excess e(S, x) of a coalition S ⊆ N is deﬁned by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
Further, let E(x) be the (2n − 2)-component vector that is composed of the excesses of
all coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅, in a non-increasing order, so E1(x) ≥ E2(x) ≥ . . . ≥
E2n−2(x). Then the nucleolus Nuc(N, v) of the game (N, v) is the unique imputation
which lexicographically minimizes the vector-valued function E(·) over the imputation set.
Formally,
Nuc(N, v) = x ∈ I(N, v) such that E(x) L E(y) for all y ∈ I(N, v),
where L denotes the lexicographic order of vectors. It is well-known that Nuc(N, v) ∈
K(N, v) and that Nuc(N, v) ∈ C(N, v) when C(N, v) = ∅. So, when the game has a
nonempty Core, then the nucleolus is in the intersection of the Kernel and the Core.
In a game (N, v), a coalition S is called inessential if it has a partition {S1, . . . , Sr}
with r ≥ 2, such that v(S) ≤
∑r
j=1 v(Sj). Coalitions which are not inessential are called
essential. Notice that single player coalitions are always essential. It is straightforward to
observe that for an inessential coalition S it holds that
e(S, x) ≤
r∑
j=1
e(Sj, x), for all x ∈ IR
n.
Therefore the Core, and thus also the nucleolus, is independent of inessential coalitions, as
was noticed by Huberman (1980). In fact, in any n player game there are at most (2n− 2)
coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus, see Brune (1983) and Reijnierse and
Potters (1998). Although, as noticed by Braˆnzei et al. (2005), identifying these coalitions
is no less laborious as computing the nucleolus itself, in the following we state some facts
for games with non-empty Core which will appear to be useful later on. We denote
e∗(N, v) = min
{S⊂N |S =∅}
− e(S, x) at x = Nuc(N, v),
i.e., e∗(N, v) the minimal negative excess at the nucleolus of game (N, v). Clearly, e∗(N, v) ≥
0 if and only if Core(N, v) = ∅.
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Lemma 2.1 If e∗(N, v) > 0, then every coalition S ⊂ N with −e(S, x) = e∗(N, v) at
x = Nuc(N, v) is essential.
Proof. Suppose S ⊂ N with −e(S, x) = e∗(N, v) is inessential. Then there is a partition
{S1, . . . , Sm} such that e∗(N, v) = −e(S, x) ≥
∑m
j=1 − e(Sj, x). Since e
∗(N, v) > 0 there
must be at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that −e(Sj , x) < −e(S, x), which contradicts that
e∗(N, v) = min{S⊂N |S =∅} − e(S, x). 
For the next lemma, let B = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a balanced collection of coalitions
and let B denote the set of all balanced collections, excluding the balanced collection {N}
having the grand coalition N as its single element.
Lemma 2.2 If e∗(N, v) ≥ 0 then
e∗(N, v) = min
B∈B
v(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j v(Sj)∑m
j=1 λ
B
j
,
with λBj , j = 1, . . . ,m, the solution of the system (2.1) for the balanced collection B =
{S1, . . . , Sm}.
Proof. Let B = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a balanced collection with λB1 , .., λ
B
m as the corresponding
solution of system (2.1). Observe that for every i ∈ N it holds that
∑
{j|i∈Sj}
λBj = 1 and
thus for every x ∈ IRn and S ⊂ N we have that x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi =
∑
i∈S
∑
{j|i∈Sj}
λBj xi.
Hence,
m∑
j=1
λBj x(Sj) =
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Sj
λBj xi =
∑
i∈N
∑
{j|i∈Sj}
λBj xi = x(N)
and thus at x = Nuc(N, v) we have that the convex combination
∑m
j=1
λBj∑
h λ
B
h
· (−e(Sj , x))
of all negative excesses −e(Sj, x), j = 1, . . . ,m, is equal to
m∑
j=1
λBj∑
h λ
B
h
· (x(Sj)− v(Sj)) =
v(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j v(Sj)∑
h λ
B
h
.
Since every −e(Sj, x) ≥ e∗(N, v), j = 1, . . . ,m, also its convex combination is at least
equal to e∗(N, v), which shows that
e∗(N, v) ≤
v(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j v(Sj)∑
h λ
B
h
. (2.2)
Finally, from Kohlberg’s theorem (see Kohlberg 1971) we know that there exists a balanced
collection B = {S1, . . . , Sm} with e∗(N, v) = −e(Sj , x) for all j. For such a balanced
collection inequality (2.2) holds with equality, which proves the lemma. 
The next two corollaries follow immediately.
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Corollary 2.3 Let B = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a balanced collection with weights λ
B
j , j =
1, . . . ,m, satisfying
e∗(N, v) =
v(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j v(Sj)∑m
j=1 λ
B
j
. (2.3)
Then at x = Nuc(N, v) we have that −e(Sj, x) = e
∗(N, v), j = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. As shown in the proof of Lemma 2.2, the right-hand side of equation (2.3) is a
convex combination of the numbers −e(Sj , x). Therefore, for each j, e∗(N, v) ≤ −e(Sj , x)
must hold with equality. 
Corollary 2.4 If e∗(N, v) > 0, then for any balanced collection B = {S1, . . . , Sm} satisfy-
ing e∗(N, v) =
v(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j v(Sj)∑m
j=1 λ
B
j
, it holds that any set Sj is essential.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.3. 
Arin and Feltkamp (1997) propose an algorithm to ﬁnd the nucleolus of a veto-rich
game, i.e., a game (N, v) such that there exists (at least one) veto player being a player
i such that v(S) = 0 when i ∈ S. The algorithm makes use of the fact that for veto-rich
games the Kernel contains precisely one payoﬀ vector, and thus the nucleolus is this unique
element of the Kernel. For an element x in the Kernel they ﬁrst show that for any player
j it holds that xj = 0 if there exists S ⊆ N \ {j} such that v(S) ≥ v(N). The algorithm is
initiated by setting xj = 0 for all these players and setting A0 as the set of these players.
Observe that this set does not contain the set of veto players (unless it is the null-game and
all players get zero payoﬀ). It is also shown that the nucleolus payoﬀ xj > 0 for all other
players j ∈ N \A0 (thus including all veto players). After this initialisation the algorithm
iteratively determines the payoﬀs of the other players as follows. Let i be an arbitrarily
chosen veto player. Then, at each step t, let At−1 be the set of players for which the payoﬀs
have been determined already and let Bt be the collection of all sets S such that i ∈ S and
(N \ At−1) \ S = ∅. Then
qt = min
S∈Bt
qt(S), (2.4)
where qt(S) =
v(N)−v(S)−x(At−1\S)
|(N\At−1)\S|+1
is determined, and for any player j ∈ ∩{S ∈ Bt|qt(S) =
qt} the nucleolus is set equal to xj = qt.
At any step t the payoﬀ of at least one player is determined, so in at most n−1 steps
all payoﬀs xj, j = i are determined. As soon as all these payoﬀs are determined, the payoﬀ
xi of the chosen veto player i is set equal to v(N) − x(N \ {i}). In the underlying paper
we modify this algorithm to ﬁnd the nucleolus of restricted games arising from games with
a permission structure in which players in a cooperative TU-game belong to a hierarchical
structure that is represented by a directed graph.
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2.3 Directed graphs
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N,D) where N ⊂ IN is a ﬁnite set of nodes (repre-
senting the players) and D ⊆ N ×N is a binary relation on N . Given (N,D) and S ⊆ N ,
the digraph (S,D(S)) is the subgraph on S given by D(S) = {(i, j) ∈ D|i, j ∈ S}. In the
sequel we simply refer to D for a digraph (N,D) and to D(S) for the subgraph (S,D(S)).
For i ∈ N the nodes in SD(i) := {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} are called the successors of i, and
the nodes in PD(i) := {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ D} are called the predecessors of i.
For given D on N , a path between i and j in N is a sequence of distinct nodes
(i1, . . . , im) such that i1 = i, im = j, and {(ik, ik+1), (ik+1, ik)}∩D = ∅ for k = 1, . . . ,m−1.
A set of nodes T ⊆ N is connected in digraph D if there is a path between any two nodes
in T that only uses arcs between nodes in T , i.e., if for every i, j ∈ T there is a path
(i1, . . . , im) between i and j such that {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ T . A component in D is a maximally
connected set T of nodes, i.e. T is connected and T ∪ {i} is not connected for every
i ∈ N \ T . A path (i1, . . . , im) between i and j in D is a directed path if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for
k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. A directed path (i1, . . . , im), m ≥ 1, in D is a cycle if (im, i1) ∈ D. We
call digraph D acyclic if it does not contain any cycle. Note that acyclicity of a digraph
D implies that D is irrefexive, i.e., (i, i) ∈ D for all i ∈ N .
A digraph is called quasi-strongly connected if there exists a node i0 ∈ N , such that
for every j = i0 there is a directed path from i0 to j. Note that this implies that N is
connected. When D is acyclic then i0 is the unique node in N having no predecessors
and i0 is called the top-node of the digraph. The collection of all acyclic, quasi-strongly
connected digraphs on N is denoted by DN . A digraph D ∈ DN is a rooted directed tree
with root i0 if there is precisely one path from the top-node i0 to every other node. Node
j ∈ N is a complete subordinate of node i ∈ N in D ∈ DN if every directed path from the
top-node i0 to node j contains node i. We denote the set of complete subordinates of node
i by SD(i), i.e.,
SD(i) =
{
j ∈ N
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ {h1, . . . , ht−1} for every sequence of nodes h1, . . . , htsuch that h1 = i0, hk+1 ∈ SD(hk), k ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, and ht = j
}
.
2.4 Restricted games
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical structure
that is represented by a directed graph, refered to as a permission structure, such that some
players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a
coalition. A triple (N, v,D) with (N, v) a TU-game and (N,D) a digraph with the player
set N as the set of nodes is called a game with a permission structure. In the sequel we
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assume that D ∈ DN and (without loss of generality) that i0 = 1 is its unique top-node
1.
Assumption 2.5 (N,D) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected with PD(1) = ∅ (and thus
PD(i) = ∅ for every i = 1).
As noticed in the introduction we can distinguish between the conjunctive and
disjunctive approach. In this paper we consider the disjunctive approach as developed in
Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), where a player i = 1 needs permission
to cooperate of at least one of its direct predecessors. Therefore a coalition is feasible if
and only if it contains the top-player 1 and for every other player in the coalition at least
one of its predecessors is also in the coalition. So, for digraph (N,D), the set of disjunctive
feasible coalitions is given by
ΦD = {S ⊆ N |PD(i) ∩ S = ∅ for all i ∈ S \ {1}} .
For any S ⊆ N , let σ(S) = ∪{T ∈ ΦD | T ⊆ S} be the largest disjunctive feasible subset
of S in D.2 By Assumption 2.5 we have that for every i = 1, there is at least one directed
path from 1 to i. As a consequence it follows that for every S ⊆ N with σ(S) = ∅, the
subgraph (σ(S),D(σ(S)) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected with node 1 ∈ σ(S) as its
unique top-node.
Given the triple (N, v,D) with v ∈ GN and D ∈ DN , under the disjunctive permis-
sion structure the induced restricted game r: 2N → R is given by
r(S) = v(σ(S)) for all S ⊆ N. (2.5)
Since player 1 is the top-node it holds that r(S) = 0 when 1 ∈ S, i.e., the restricted game is
a veto-rich game with respect to the top-player 1. If D is a rooted directed tree (with node
1 as its root), then |PD(i)| = 1 for all i = 1 and the conjunctive and disjunctive approach
coincide. In this case the triple (N, v,D) is a peer group situation when the game (N, v)
is a non-negative additive game (see Braˆnzei et. al. (2002)), i.e., there exist real numbers
ai, i ∈ N , such that v(S) =
∑
i∈S ai, S ⊆ N . Then the restricted game (N, r) as deﬁned
in (2.5) is a so-called peer group game and is given by
r(S) = v(σ(S)) =
∑
{i∈S|P̂D(i)⊆S}
ai,
where j ∈ P̂D(i) if and only if if there exists a sequence of players (h1, . . . , ht) such that
h1 = j, hk+1 ∈ S(hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t − 1, and ht = i. A peer group game (N, r) is a
1This implies that 1 ∈ N . Later we consider reduced games on proper subsets of N ′ ⊂ N , but the
top-player 1 always belongs to N ′.
2Every coalition having a unique largest feasible subset follows from ΦD being closed under union.
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monotone veto-rich game and has a non-empty Core. In particular (with 1 the veto player)
the payoﬀ vector x ∈ IRn+ given by x1 = v(N) and xi = 0, i = 1, belongs to the Core.
As noticed in Braˆnzei et al. (2002), this class of games with permission structure contains
several interesting applications.
3 Weak digraph monotonicity and concavity
The algorithm to be presented in Section 5 holds for games with a permission structure
(N, v,D) satisfying the next two conditions. First, we say that a game with permission
structure (N, v,D) satisﬁes weak digraph monotonicity if
[S ⊆ N and S ∈ ΦD]⇒ v(S) ≤ v(N). (3.6)
Observe that weak digraph monotonicity weakens monotonicity in two respects, namely (i)
the monotocity condition v(S) ≤ v(T ) if S ⊆ T only has to hold for T = N and (ii) for sets
S that are feasible given the disjunctive permission structure on the digraph D. Second,
we say that a game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisﬁes weak digraph concavity if
[S ∪ T = N and S, T ∈ ΦD]⇒ v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(N). (3.7)
Observe that also this property weakens the concavity of a game in two respects, namely
that the concavity condition only has to hold for sets that S and T satisfying (i) S∪T = N
and (ii) S and T are feasible given the disjunctive permission structure on D. So, for both
properties the adjunctive ‘weak’ means that the inequality conditions are only required for
T = N , respectively S ∪ T = N , and the adjunctive ‘digraph’ means that the inequality
conditions are only required for feasible sets with respect to the permission structure.
Monotonicity is a condition satisﬁed by most of the games that arise from economic or
social situations, so this is certainly the case for weak digraph monotonicity. Although
concavity is a strong condition for proﬁt games3, weak digraph concavity is considerably
weaker and is also satisﬁed by several interesting classes of proﬁt games with permission
structure. We give some examples.
Example 3.1 Generalised peer group situations
It is obvious that peer group situations (N, v,D) as mentioned at the end of Subsection 2.4
satisfy weak digraph monotonicity. Further, for any feasible S and T such that S ∪T = N
we have that S ∩ T is feasible (since D is a rooted tree) and
v(S) + v(T ) =
∑
i∈S
ai +
∑
i∈T
ai =
∑
i∈S∩T
ai +
∑
i∈N
ai = v(S ∩ T ) + v(N).
3Given our nucleolus concept in which the maximum excess v(S)−x(S) is minimized, in this paper we
deal with proﬁt games.
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So, (N, v,D) also satisﬁes weak digraph concavity.
We say that (N, v,D) is a generalised peer group situation when D ∈ DN is an
acyclic and quasi-strongly connected digraph (and v is again a nonnegative additive game).
Clearly, any generalised peer group situation satisﬁes weak digraph monotonicity and weak
digraph concavity. It now might happen that S ∩ T is not feasible under the disjunctive
approach. Then the weak digraph concavity condition might hold with strict inequality. 
Example 3.2 Generalised information market situation
Let S = {S1, . . . , SK} be a collection of K (nonempty) subsets of N , and αk, k = 1, . . . , K,
be positive numbers. Then we consider the game (N, v) given by
v(S) =
∑
{k|Sk∩S =∅}
αk, S ⊆ N. (3.8)
Further, let D ∈ DN be any digraph satisfying (1, j) ∈ D for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. So, j = 1
is the top-player and S ⊆ N is feasible if and only if 1 ∈ S. Now, the restricted game
(N, r) is given by r(S) = 0 if 1 ∈ S and
r(S) =
∑
{k|Sk∩S =∅}
αk, if 1 ∈ S.
The game (N, r) is an information game as introduced in Muto et al. (1989). Obviously,
(N, v,D) satisﬁes weak digraph monotonicity. Further, for any feasible S and T such that
S ∪ T = N we have that S ∩ T is feasible and
v(S) + v(T ) =
∑
{k|Sk∩S =∅}
αk +
∑
{k|Sk∩T =∅}
αk =
∑
{k|Sk∩(S∩T ) =∅}
αk +
∑
{k|Sk∩N =∅}
αk = v(S ∩ T ) + v(N)
where the last but one equality follows since S ∪T = N . Thus (N, v,D) also satisﬁes weak
digraph concavity. In fact, this condition is satisﬁed for any D ∈ DN . In case S ∩ T is not
feasible the condition might hold with strict inequality.
Observe that also any game with permission structure (N, v,D) where v is the sum
of an additive game and a game as given above in equation (3.8), satisﬁes the conditions
of weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph concavity. 
Example 3.3 Market situation
Let the set N consist of one seller, say player 1, having one item for sale, and n−1 buyers,
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and let aj be the nonnegative surplus of trade between the seller and buyer j, j = 2, . . . , n.
Then the market game is given by (N, v) with v(S) = 0 if 1 ∈ S and
v(S) = max
j∈S\{1}
aj , if 1 ∈ S.
Further, let D ∈ DN be any digraph satisfying (1, j) ∈ D for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. So, S ⊆ N
is feasible if and only if 1 ∈ S. Then for any feasible S and T such that S ∪ T = N we
have that
v(N) = max[v(S), v(T )]
and
v(S ∩ T ) ≤ min[v(S), v(T )].
Hence
v(S) + v(T ) = max[v(S), v(T )] + min[v(S), v(T )] ≥ v(N) + v(S ∩ T ).
Hence (N, v,D) also satisﬁes weak digraph concavity. Clearly, it also satisﬁes weak digraph
monotonicity. 
4 Essential and feasible coalitions
In this section we prove several results of essential and feasible coalitions for games with
permission structure (N, v,D) that will be used later on to prove that the algorithm of
Section 5 will indeed ﬁnd the nucleolus of the restricted game. The ﬁrst lemma does not
yet require the two conditions (3.6) and (3.7) and says that any essential coalition with at
least two elements is feasible.
Lemma 4.1 If S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2 is essential in the restricted game (N, r), then S is
feasible.
Proof. Suppose that S is not feasible. Then r(S) = r(σ(S)) with σ(S) ⊂ S. Since
r(j) = 0 for all j ∈ S \ σ(S), it holds that r(S) = r(σ(S)) +
∑
j∈S\σ(S) r(j), implying that
S is not essential. 
Assume that (N, v,D) satisﬁes condition (3.6). Then it follows that the restricted
game (N, r) is a weak monotone (r(S) ≤ r(N) for all S ⊆ N) veto-rich game (with veto
player 1) and therefore the Core contains the payoﬀ vector (r(N), 0, . . . , 0)⊤ ∈ IRn and thus
is not empty. (Observe that r(N) = v(N).) Hence, Nuc(N, r) is in the Core of (N, r) and
independent of inessential coalitions. From now on we make the following assumption.
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Assumption 4.2 N is essential in the restricted game (N, r).
In fact, when (N, v,D) is weak digraph monotone, this assumption is without loss of
generality. If N is inessential then there exists a partition {S1, . . . , Sm} such that (i)
r(N) ≤
∑m
j=1 r(Sj), (ii) S1 is essential, and (iii) 1 ∈ S1. Because of (iii) we have that
S2, . . . , Sm are not feasible and thus r(Sj) = 0 for j = 2, . . . ,m. Together with weak
digraph monotonicity this implies that r(N) = r(S1). So, according to Arin and Feltkamp
(1997), the nucleolus assigns a zero payoﬀ to every player not in S1, and we can restrict
ourselves to the subgame and subgraph on the essential coalition S1 containing player 1.
For N essential, also observe that according to Arin and Feltkamp (1997) the nucleolus
assigns positive payoﬀ to any player in N . Since the assumption that N is essential in the
game (N, r) implies that r(N) > r(S) for every S ⊂ N , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 If game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfies condition (3.6), then
e∗(N, r) > 0.
Proof. Since C(N, r) = ∅ we have that e∗(N, r) ≥ 0. Hence, according to Lemma 2.2 it
holds that
e∗(N, r) = min
B∈B
r(N)−
∑m
j=1 λ
B
j r(Sj)∑m
j=1 λ
B
j
,
with λBj , j = 1, . . . ,m, the solution of the system (2.1) for the balanced collection B. Since
r(Sj) = 0 when 1 ∈ Sj, we obtain that
e∗(N, r) = min
B∈B
r(N)−
∑
{j|1∈Sj}
λBj r(Sj)∑m
j=1 λ
B
j
.
Since the collection {N} does not belong to B, any Sj in a balanced collection B is a real
subset of N and thus r(Sj) < r(N) for any Sj, because N is essential. Since
∑
{j|1∈Sj}
λBj =
1 by the deﬁnition of balancedness, it follows that r(N) −
∑
{j|1∈Sj}
λBj r(Sj) > 0 for any
B ∈ B, which proves the lemma. 
Similar as in Arin and Feltkamp (1997), in the sequel we denote for S ⊂ N and the
restricted game (N, r),
τ (S, r) =
r(N)− r(S)
|N \ S|+ 1
.
In the following, ΩD = ΦD \ {N} denotes the collection of all feasible coalitions not equal
to N . We now have the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.4 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy condition (3.6). Then
e∗(N, r) = min
S∈ΩD
τ(S, r).
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Proof. According to Kohlberg’s theorem there exists a balanced collection {S1, . . . , Sm}
such that −e(Sk, x) = e∗(N, r) for all k = 1, . . . ,m. Since e∗(N, r) > 0 by Lemma 4.3,
according to Corollary 2.4 we have that any Sj is essential. Without loss of generality, let
1 ∈ S1. Then, we have that either S1 = {1} and thus feasible, or |S1| > 1 and thus feasible
according to Lemma 4.1. Denote U = S1. Now, consider j ∈ U . Since the collection
is balanced, there must be a coalition Sk = S1 = U containing j, but not 1. Then Sk
is essential, but not feasible. Hence it follows with Lemma 4.1 that |Sk| = 1 and thus
Sk = {j}. Now, let λBU and λ
B
j , j ∈ U , be the corresponding weights. Then λ
B
U = λ
B
j = 1,
j ∈ U . Further r(j) = 0 for all j ∈ U since {j} is not feasible. Substituting these values in
(2.3) gives e∗(N, r) =
r(N)−λB
U
r(U)
|N\U |+1 = τ (U, r), showing that there exists a coalition U ∈ Ω
D
satisfying e∗(N, r) = τ(U, r). Next, consider any S ∈ ΩD. Then B = {S} ∪ {{j} | j ∈ S}
is a balanced collection with corresponding weights λBS = λ
B
j = 1, j ∈ S. Since 1 ∈ S
(because S is feasible), it follows that r(j) = 0 for all j ∈ S. Hence with Lemma 2.2 we
obtain that that e∗(N, r) ≤
r(N)−λBS r(S)−
∑
j ∈S λ
B
j r(j)
|N\S|+1 =
r(N)−r(S)
|N\S|+1 = τ (S, r). 
Lemma 4.5 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy condition (3.6), let U ∈
ΩD be such that τ (U, r) = e∗(N, r), and let y ∈ IRn be such that y(U) = r(U) + τ (U, r) and
yj = τ(U, r) for all j ∈ U . Then x = Nuc(N, r) satisfies x(U) = y(U) and xj = yj for all
j ∈ U .
Proof. First, observe that
y(N) = y(U) +
∑
j ∈U
yj = r(U) + (|N \ U |+ 1)τ(U, r) = r(N),
so y is eﬃcient. Next, observe that U is feasible and thus 1 ∈ U . Hence for any j ∈ U ,
the singleton coalition {j} is not feasible and thus r(j) = 0. Therefore the excesses for the
coalitions U ∈ ΦD and the singletons {j}, j ∈ U , at y are equal to e(U, y) = −τ(U, r) =
e({j}, y), j ∈ U . Now, suppose that x = Nuc(N, r) does not satisfy x(U) = y(U) and
xj = yj. Then
min[−e(U, x), min
j ∈U
−e({j}, x)] < τ(U, r),
contradicting that τ(U, r) = e∗(N, r) = min{S⊂N,S =∅} − e(S, x). 
The two lemmas above show that as soon as a coalition U ∈ ΩD has been found
with τ (U, r) = minS∈ΩD τ (S, r), the nucleolus values of all players j ∈ U have been found
and that these values are equal to τ (U, r). This gives us the basic idea for the algorithm
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in the next section. In the sequel, denote τ ∗(r) = minS∈ΩD τ(S, r). In the ﬁrst step the
algorithm searches for a coalition U1 ∈ ΩD satisfying
τ (U1, r) = τ
∗(r) and |U1| = max
{U∈ΩD|τ(U,r)=τ∗(r)}
|U |, (4.9)
i.e., any other feasible set U = N satisfying τ(U, r) = τ∗(r) contains at most the same
number of players as U1. This gives nucleolus payoﬀs τ
∗(r) = τ(U1, r) to any player j ∈ U1
and in the next step the algorithm continues with a search on a reduced set of players U1.
The details of the algortihm will be given in the next section. In the remaining of this
section we give several results with respect to a set U1 satisfying condition (4.9). These
results will be used in Section 5 to prove that the algorithm indeed ﬁnds the nucleolus.
Observe that the results above only require weak digraph monotonicity. The next results
require both weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph concavity.
Lemma 4.6 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy conditions (3.6) and
(3.7) and, for a coalition U1 satisfying condition (4.9), let {T1, T2} be a partition of N \U1.
Then at least one of the two coalitions U1 ∪ T1, U1 ∪ T2 is not feasible.
Proof. Suppose that both sets U1 ∪ T1 and U1 ∪ T2 are feasible. Then we have that
|T2|+ 1
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
τ (U1 ∪ T1, r) +
|T1|+ 1
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
τ(U1 ∪ T2, r) =
=
r(N)− r(N \ T2)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
+
r(N)− r(N \ T1)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
=
=
2r(N)− r(N \ T1)− r(N \ T2)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
≤
r(N)− r(U1)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
,
where the last inequality follows from condition (3.7) for the sets N \ Tj, j = 1, 2, since
r(N) = v(N), r(U1) = v(U1) by the feasibility of U1, and for i ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, we have
that r(N \Tj) = r(U1 ∪ Ti) = v(U1 ∪ Ti) because of the feasibility of U1 ∪ Ti. Further since
r(U1) = v(U1) ≤ v(N) = r(N) because of condition (3.6), we have that
r(N)− r(U1)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 2
≤
r(N)− r(U1)
|T1|+ |T2|+ 1
= τ(U1, r).
So, τ (U1, r) is at least equal to the given convex combination of τ(U1 ∪ T1, r) and τ(U1 ∪
T2, r), implying that for at least one i, i = 1, 2, it holds that
τ (U1 ∪ Ti, r) ≤ τ (U1, r).
This contradicts condition (4.9). 
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The next proposition says that for a set U1 satisfying condition (4.9) the complement
N\U1 is connected and that the collection of all successors of players in U1 contains precisely
one player not in U1. For T ⊆ N , let SD(T ) = ∪i∈T SD(i) denote the union of all successors
of at least one player of T in the digraph (N,D).
Proposition 4.7 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy conditions (3.6)
and (3.7) and let U1 be a coalition satisfying condition (4.9). Then:
1. The set N \ U1 is connected,
2. |SD(U1) ∩ (N \ U1)| = 1.
Proof. 1. To prove 1, suppose N \ U1 consists of at least two components. Let T1 be one
of the components and denote T2 = N \ (U1 ∪ T1). We show that both U1 ∪ Ti, i = 1, 2 are
feasible.
To do so, let i be any player in T1. By quasi-strongly connectedness of (N,D),
there exists a directed path (i1, i2, . . . , im) from i1 = 1 to im = i. Let ik, 1 ≤ k < m,
be the last player in the path not in T1, thus ik ∈ U1 ∪ T2 and ik+1, . . . , im ∈ T1. Since
(ik, ik+1) ∈ D, ik ∈ T2 contradicts that T1 is a component of N \ U1. Hence ik ∈ U1. Since
U1 is feasible, 1 ∈ U1 and there is a path (j1, . . . , jℓ) from j1 = 1 to jℓ = ik with jr ∈ U1
for all r = 1, . . . , ℓ. Hence for any i ∈ T1 there is a path (j1, . . . , jℓ, ik+1, . . . , im) from 1 to
i only containing nodes in U1 ∪ T1. This shows that U1 ∪ T1 is feasible. Similarly it follows
that U1 ∪ T2 is feasible. This contradicts Lemma 4.6, which proves the ﬁrst statement.
2. To prove 2, assume that there are two players i1, i2 ∈ SD(U1)∩ (N \U1), i1 = i2.
For any player i ∈ N \ U1, let S˜D(i) be deﬁned as the subset of N \ U1 such that node
j ∈ N \ U1 belongs to S˜D(i) if and only if j = i or there is a directed path from node i to
node j that only consists of nodes in N \ U1. Since (N,D) is acyclic by assumption, we
have that i1 ∈ S˜D(i2) or i2 ∈ S˜D(i1) (or both). Suppose i2 ∈ S˜D(i1). We now consider the
partition of N \U1 into two non-empty sets T1 = S˜D(i1) and T2 = (N \U1) \T1 and obtain
a contradiction by using Lemma 4.6. Since there is a directed path from node 1 to i1 ∈ T1
consisting of nodes in U1 ∪ {i1}, and from i1 ∈ T1 to any other node in T1 consisting of
nodes in T1, for each j ∈ U1 ∪ T1 there is a path in U1 ∪ T1 from 1 to j, and thus U1 ∪ T1
is feasible.
Next consider U1 ∪ T2. For a node j ∈ T2, let (i1, i2, . . . , im) be a path from
i1 = 1 to im = j and let ik, 1 ≤ k < m, be the last player in the path not in T2, thus
ik ∈ N \ T2 = U1 ∪ T1. Then ik ∈ U1, because ik ∈ T1 = S˜D(i1) contradicts that j ∈ T1.
Since U1 is feasible, there is a path (j1, . . . , jℓ) from j1 = 1 to jℓ = ik with jr ∈ U1 for all
r = 1, . . . , ℓ. Hence for any j ∈ T2 there is a path (j1, . . . , jℓ, ik+1, . . . , im) from 1 to j only
containing nodes in U1∪T2. This shows that U1∪T2 is feasible. Hence the existence of two
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players in SD(U1)∩(N \U1) contradicts Lemma 4.6, which proves the second statement. 
For U1 satisfying condition (4.9), let i1 be the unique node in SD(U1) ∩ (N \ U1)
i.e., i1 is the unique successor of U1 in N \ U1. Since 1 ∈ U1, this implies that any path
from node 1 to a player j ∈ N \ U1 has node i1 as the ﬁrst player on the path not in U1.
Together with the connectedness of N \ U1 (see Proposition 4.7) this gives the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.8 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy conditions (3.6) and
(3.7) and let U1 be a coalition satisfying condition (4.9). Then the subgraph (N \U1, D(N \
U1)) of (N,D) on N \U1 is also a quasi-strongly connected, acyclic directed graph with one
top-node (node i1).
5 An algorithm for computing the nucleolus
Since disjunctive restricted games are veto-rich games we can apply the exponential time
algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997) to ﬁnd the nucleolus of the restricted game (N, r)
of a game with permission structure (N, v,D) that satisﬁes conditions (3.6) and (3.7).
However, instead of directly applying the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp to (N, r), in this
section we give a modiﬁed version of the algorithm which ﬁnds the nucleolus in polynomial
time by making use of the hierarchical structure given by the digraph (N,D). In particular
the hierarchical structure reduces at each step t the minimization problem to ﬁnd qt (see
(2.4)), because it is suﬃcient to consider the feasible sets.
Let node 1 be the unique top node in (N,D), and thus 1 is a veto player in the
restricted game (N, r). We again assume that (N, v,D) satisﬁes the conditions (3.6) and
(3.7) and that N is essential in (N, r). Further for the reduced game with permission
structure (Uk, vk, Dk) deﬁned in iteration k−1 at Step 3 of the algorithm given below, the set
ΩDk denotes the set of all feasible coalitions not equal to Uk in the digraph (Uk, Dk). Also,
for i ∈ Uk, we denote by SDk(i) and PDk(i) the set of successors, respectively predecessors
in (Uk,Dk). Then the algorithm proceeds as follows.
Algorithm
Step 1 Set k = 0, U0 = N , v0 = v, D0 = D and r0 = r. Goto Step 2.
Step 2 Find Uk+1 ⊂ Uk satisfying condition (4.9) with respect to game with permission
structure (Uk, vk, Dk), i.e.,
τ(Uk+1, rk) = τ
∗(rk) and |Uk+1| = max
{U∈ΩDk |τ(U,rk)=τ∗(rk)}
|U |,
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where τ ∗(rk) = minU∈ΩDk τ (U, rk) with τ(U, rk) =
rk(Uk)−rk(U)
|Uk\U |+1
. Assign yj = τ
∗(rk) to
every player j ∈ Uk \ Uk+1. Goto Step 3.
Step 3 If Uk+1 = {1} then Goto Step 4. If Uk+1 = {1}, let ik+1 be the unique top-player of
the subgraph (Uk\Uk+1, Dk(Uk \Uk+1) of the digraph (Uk, Dk) restricted to Uk\Uk+1.
Deﬁne game (Uk+1, vk+1) by setting for every U ⊆ Uk+1,
vk+1(U) =
{
vk(U) if PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅
vk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| else,
(5.10)
digraph (Uk+1,Dk+1) given by
(i, j) ∈ Dk+1 if
{
(i, j) ∈ Dk or
i ∈ PDk(ik+1) and j ∈ SDk(Uk \ Uk+1) ∩ Uk+1.
(5.11)
and let rk+1 be the restricted game of (Uk+1, vk+1,Dk+1). Set k = k + 1. Goto Step
2.
Step 4 Assign y1 = v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{1} xj . Stop.
In every step of the algorithm, for Uk+1 ⊂ Uk satisfying condition (4.9) with respect
to (Uk, vk,Dk), any player in Uk \ Uk+1 receives payoﬀ τ (Uk+1, rk). Observe that at any
iteration the new found set Uk+1 is essential in (Uk+1, rk+1). If not, there exists an essential
subset S of Uk+1 with rk+1(S) = rk+1(Uk), yielding payoﬀ yj = 0 for all j ∈ Uk+1 \S. This
contradicts that all players get positive payoﬀ (because it is assumed that N is essential).
Since in any iteration the payoﬀ of at least one player is determined, in at most k = n− 1
iterations the algorithm stops with Uk+1 = {1} and player 1 getting what is left from v(N)
after all other players received their payoﬀs as determined by the algorithm. (Note that
player 1 belongs to the player set of every game (Uk,Dk) that appears in the algorithm.)
In the remaining of this section we show that the algorithm indeed yields the nucleolus.
Let K be such that UK+1 = {1}. To show that the algorithm is well-deﬁned, it is
needed that the results of Section 4 hold for every game (Uk, rk), k = 1, . . . , K. This is
shown in the next two lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma states that for any k = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1
the digraph (Uk+1,Dk+1) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected with i = 1 as its unique
top-node.
Lemma 5.1 The digraph (Uk+1, Dk+1) satisfies Assumption 2.5 for any k = 0, 1, . . . ,K−1.
Proof. Since (N,D) satisﬁes Assumption 2.5, the statement is true for k = 0. We now
proceed by induction and suppose that the statement is true for j = 0, . . . , k, k < K − 1.
Then it remains to show that the statement is true for j = k + 1. By the induction
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hypothesis we have that (Uk, Dk) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected and has i = 1 as
its unique top node. So, for any j = 1 in Uk+1 there is a directed path i1, . . . , im in (Uk, Dk)
with i1 = 1 and im = j. If any node ik, k = 2, . . . ,m − 1 in this path is in Uk+1, then
this path also exists in (Uk+1,Dk+1). Otherwise, for any node ih on the path not in Uk+1,
there exist two (not necessarily diﬀerent) nodes ir, is on the path with r ≤ h ≤ s such
that ir−1, is+1 ∈ Uk+1 and ir, is ∈ Uk+1. Then by (5.11) we have that (ir−1, is+1) ∈ Dk+1.
Hence there is a directed path from i = 1 to i = j in (Uk+1, Dk+1), showing (Uk+1, Dk+1) is
quasi-strongly connected with node 1 as top node. Because in (Uk+1, Dk+1) there can only
be a directed path from node i to node j if there is a directed path from i to j in (Uk, Dk),
the acyclicity of (Uk+1, Dk+1) follows immediately from the fact that (Uk, Dk) is acyclic.

The next lemma shows that any game (Uk, vk,Dk), k = 0, 1, . . . , K satisﬁes the
conditions of weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph concavity. Again the proof is
by induction, where Proposition 4.7 is used to show the weak digraph monotonicity.
Lemma 5.2 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy conditions (3.6) and
(3.7). Then the game with permission structure (Uk, vk, Dk) satisfies these conditions on
the player set Uk for every k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on k. For k = 0 both conditions (3.6) and
(3.7) are satisﬁed by assumption. Proceeding by induction, assume that these conditions
are satisﬁed for j = 0, . . . , k, k < K − 1. By Lemma 5.1 the digraph (Uk, Dk) satisﬁes
Assumption 2.5. So, the game (Uk, vk, Dk) satisﬁes all conditions of Proposition 4.7.
To show that condition (3.6) holds for (Uk+1, vk+1, Dk+1), we have to show that [U ⊆
Uk+1 and U feasible in (Uk+1, Dk+1)]⇒ vk+1(U) ≤ vk+1(Uk+1). Since PDk(ik+1)∩Uk+1 = ∅,
we have that
vk+1(Uk+1) = vk(Uk+1 ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| = vk(Uk)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|.
Next, let U ⊆ Uk+1 be a feasible subset of Uk+1 in (Uk+1,Dk+1). We consider two cases,
either PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅ or PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅. In the latter case we have that (i)
vk+1(U) = vk(U) and (ii) there is an arc between two nodes i and j of U in the digraph
(Uk+1, Dk+1) if and only if there is also an arc between i and j in (Uk, Dk). Hence U is also
feasible in (Uk, Dk) and thus vk+1(U) = vk(U) = rk(U). Moreover, τ(U, rk) =
rk(Uk)−rk(U)
|Uk\U |+1
≥
τ(Uk+1, rk) and thus rk(Uk)− rk(U) ≥ (|Uk \ U |+ 1)τ(Uk+1, rk). Hence
vk+1(U) = rk(U) ≤ rk(Uk)− (|Uk \ U |+ 1)τ(Uk+1, rk)
< vk(Uk)− |Uk \ Uk+1|τ (Uk+1, rk) = vk+1(Uk+1).
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In case PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅, we obtain from applying Proposition 4.7 to (Uk, vk, Dk), that
U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1) is feasible in (Uk, Dk). From this it follows that
vk+1(U) = vk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
≤ vk(Uk)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| = vk+1(Uk+1)
because condition (3.6) holds for (Uk, vk,Dk).
Next we consider condition (3.7), i.e., we have to show that [S ∪T = Uk+1 and S, T
feasible in (Uk+1, Dk+1)]⇒ vk+1(S) + vk+1(T ) ≥ vk+1(S ∩ T ) + vk+1(Uk+1). Since S ∪ T =
Uk+1 we have that PDk(ik+1)∩S = ∅ or PDk(ik+1)∩ T = ∅ (or both). We ﬁrst consider the
case that both intersections are nonempty and thus also PDk(ik+1) ∩ (S ∩ T ) = ∅. Then
S ′ = S ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1), T ′ = T ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1) are feasible in (Uk, Dk) and S ′ ∪ T ′ = Uk, and
thus it follows from condition (3.7) for (Uk, vk, Dk) that
vk+1(S) + vk+1(T ) = vk(S
′) + vk(T
′)− 2τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
≥ vk(S
′ ∩ T ′) + vk(Uk)− 2τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
= vk((S ∩ T ) ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) + vk(Uk)− 2τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
= vk+1(S ∩ T ) + vk+1(Uk+1),
where the last equality follows from the fact that vk+1(S∩T ) = vk((S∩T )∪ (Uk \Uk+1))−
τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \Uk+1| and vk+1(Uk+1) = vk(Uk)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \Uk+1|. In case one of the
sets S and T has a nonempty intersection with PDk(ik+1) and thus PDk(ik+1)∩ (S∩T ) = ∅,
suppose without loss of generality that T ∩PDk(ik+1) = ∅. Then S
′ = S∪(Uk \Uk+1) and T
are feasible in (Uk, Dk), S
′∪T = N and thus it follows from condition (3.7) for (Uk, vk, Dk)
that
vk+1(S) + vk+1(T ) = vk(S
′) + vk(T )− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
≥ vk((S
′ ∩ T )) + vk(Uk)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|
= vk+1(S ∩ T ) + vk+1(Uk+1),
where the last equality follows from the fact that vk(S
′ ∩ T ) = vk(S ∩ T ) = vk+1(S ∩ T )
and vk(Uk)− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| = vk+1(Uk+1). 
In the remaining of this section we show that for k = 1, . . . , K, the game (Uk+1, rk+1)
is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the game (Uk, rk) with respect to the nucleolus.
For a game (N, v), let T ⊂ N be a nonempty coalition and y ∈ IRn a payoﬀ vector.
Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game on T at y is the game (T, vyT ) given by v
y
T (T ) =
v(N)−x(N \T ) and vyT (S) = maxQ⊆N\T (v(S ∪Q)− y(Q)), S ⊂ T , S = N . Observe that
in the deﬁnition of the reduced game only the values yj of the players j ∈ N \T appear. In
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the following, let (Uk+1, r
′
k) denote the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the game (Uk, rk)
on the set Uk+1 at y with yj = τ
∗(rk) = τ (Uk+1, rk) for j ∈ Uk \ Uk+1.
We ﬁrst show the following lemma on the largest disjunctive feasible subset of a
coalition U in the digraph (Uk, Dk). In the sequel we denote this set by σk(U). Observe
that for U ⊆ N we have that σ0(U) = σ(U).
Lemma 5.3 For the game with permission structure (Uk, vk, Dk), let Uk+1 ⊂ Uk and ik+1 ∈
Uk+1 be the set and node as obtained in the iteration k of the algorithm. Then for each
U ⊆ Uk+1 we have that
1. σk+1(U) = σk(U) if SDk(σk(U)) ⊂ Uk+1;
2. σk+1(U) = σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1) if ik+1 ∈ SDk(σk(U)).
Proof. 1. Consider U ⊆ Uk+1 with SDk(σk(U)) ⊂ Uk+1. Clearly, then σk(U) is feasible
in (Uk+1, Dk+1) and thus σk(U) ⊆ σk+1(U). Next, suppose that there exists some player
i ∈ σk+1(U) \ σk(U). Then there is path (a0, a1, . . . , al) such that (i) a0 = 1, (ii) al = i,
(iii) at ∈ U for all t = 1, . . . , l − 1, and (iv) (at, at+1) ∈ Dk+1 for all t = 0, . . . , l − 1. If
(at, at+1) ∈ Dk for all t = 0, . . . , l − 1, then i ∈ σk(U) and we get a contradiction with
our assumption that i ∈ σk+1(U) \ σk(U). So, there must exist a t ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1} such
that (at, at+1) ∈ Dk. By deﬁnition of digraph Dk+1 it holds that at ∈ PDk(ik+1), which
contradicts SDk(σk(U)) ⊂ Uk+1. Hence σk+1(U) = σk(U).
2. Consider U ⊆ Uk+1 with ik+1 ∈ SDk(σk(U)). If there is a player i ∈ σk+1(U) then there
is a path (a0, a1, . . . , al) such that (i) a0 = 1, (ii) al = i, (iii), at ∈ U for all t = 1, . . . , l− 1,
and (iv) (at, at+1) ∈ Dk+1 for all t = 0, . . . , l − 1. We show that these four conditions also
describe all elements of
σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1)
If (at, at+1) ∈ Dk for all t = 0, . . . , l − 1, then i ∈ σk(U). Since U ⊆ Uk+1, it follows that
i ∈ σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1). Otherwise, if (at, at+1) ∈ Dk+1 \Dk for some t, then
at ∈ PDk(ik+1) and at+1 ∈ SDk(Uk \Uk+1). So there is a path from at to at+1 which contains
only elements from Uk \Uk+1. In the path (a0, a1, . . . , al), replace the arc (at, at+1) by this
path from at to at+1.
Continuing in this way, we can change each arc in the path (a0, a1, . . . , al) that belongs to
Dk+1 \Dk by a path which consists only of elements from Uk \ Uk+1. So, we have a path
from 1 to i which consists only of elements from U ∪ (Uk \Uk+1), implying that i ∈ σk(U ∪
(Uk \ Uk+1)). Since i ∈ Uk \ Uk+1, we conclude that i ∈ σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1).
So, in both cases we have that i ∈ σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1) and therefore we get
σk+1(U) = σk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) \ (Uk \ Uk+1).
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The next lemma shows that the game (Uk+1, rk+1) is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of
the game (Uk, rk) with respect to the nucleolus.
Lemma 5.4 Let game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfy conditions (3.6) and
(3.7). Then, for k = 0, . . . , K, the game (Uk+1, rk+1) is equal to the Davis-Maschler reduced
game (Uk+1, r
′
k) of the game (Uk, rk) on Uk+1 at y with yj = τ
∗(rk) for j ∈ Uk \ Uk+1.
Proof. For coalition T ⊆ Uk+1, we consider two cases, namely whether or not SDk(σk(T )) ⊂
Uk+1. In case SDk(σk(T )) ⊂ Uk+1, Lemma 5.3.1 implies that σk+1(T ) = σk(T ).
Further, since PDk(ik+1)∩σk(T ) = ∅ we have by equation (5.10) in Step 3 of the algorithm
that vk+1(T ) = vk(T ) and thus rk+1(T ) = rk(T ) because σk+1(T ) = σk(T ). On the other
hand, for the Davis-Mashler reduced game (Uk+1, r
′
k) it holds for any T ⊂ Uk+1 that
r′k(T ) = max
Q⊆Uk\Uk+1
(rk(T ∪Q)− y(Q)) = rk(T ),
because for any Q ⊆ Uk \ Uk+1 we have that
rk(T ∪Q
′) = vk(σk(T ∪Q)) = vk(σk(T )) = rk(T ),
where the second equality follows since for any pair j ∈ (T \ σk(T ) ∪Q) and i ∈ σk(T ), it
holds that (i, j) ∈ Dk and thus σk(T ∪Q) = σk(T ). Hence r
′
k(T ) = rk(T ) = rk+1(T ).
In case SDk(σk(T )) is not a subset of Uk+1 we have that PDk(ik+1) ∩ σk(T ) = ∅, because
ik+1 is the unique successor of Uk+1 in Uk \ Uk+1. So, by equation (5.10) in Step 3 of the
algorithm we have that
rk+1(T ) = vk+1(σk+1(T )) = vk(σk+1(T ) ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|.
From Lemma 5.3 we have that σk+1(T ) ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1) = σk(T ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)) and so
rk+1(T ) = vk(σk(T ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1)))− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| =
rk(T ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1|.
To show that rk+1(T ) = r
′
k(T ) it remains to prove that the right-hand term in the equation
r′k(T ) = max
Q⊆Uk\Uk+1
(rk(T ∪Q)− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Q|)
obtains its maximum for Uk \ Uk+1. To do so, denote Q = Uk \ Uk+1, V = T ∪Q and, for
Q ⊆ Q, denoteW = Uk+1∪Q. Then (because of Lemma 5.3) the sets σk(V ) = σk+1(T )∪Q
and σk(W ) = σk(Uk+1∪Q) ⊇ Uk+1 are feasible and satisfy σk(V )∪σk(W ) = Uk. By Lemma
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5.2 the game with permission structure (Uk, vk, Dk) satisﬁes weak digraph concavity and
thus
rk(V ) + r(W ) = vk(σk(V )) + vk(σk(W )) ≥ vk(Uk) + vk(σk(V ) ∩ σk(W )) =
vk(Uk) + vk(σk(V ∩W )) = rk(Uk) + rk(V ∩W ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that σk(V ∩W ) = σk(V )∩ σk(W ) because
of the graph structure. With V ∩W = (T ∪Q) ∩ (Uk+1 ∪Q) = T ∪Q this yields
rk(T ∪Q)− rk(T ∪Q) ≥ rk(Uk)− rk(Uk+1 ∪Q) >
rk(Uk)− r(Uk+1 ∪Q)
|Q| − |Q|+ 1
(|Q| − |Q|) =
τ (Uk+1 ∪Q)(|Q| − |Q|) ≥ τ (Uk+1, rk)(|Q| − |Q|)
by deﬁnition of Uk+1. Hence
rk(T ∪Q)− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Q| > rk(T ∪Q)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Q|,
for all Q ⊆ Q, which shows that indeed
rk(T ∪Q)− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Q| = max
Q⊆Uk\Uk+1
(rk(T ∪Q)− τ(Uk+1, rk)|Q|) .

We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5 Given game with permission structure (N, v,D) satisfying the conditions
(3.6) and (3.7), the algorithm described by the Steps 1-4 above yields the nucleolus of (N, r).
Proof. In iteration k = 0 the algorithm assigns in Step 2 the value τ∗(r0) = τ(U1, r0) =
τ(U1, r) to any player j ∈ U0\U1 = N \U1. According to Lemma 4.5, τ∗(r0) is the nucleolus
value of the players inN\U1. Applying Lemma 5.4 for k = 0, the game (U1, r1) is the Davis-
Maschler reduced game of the game (N, r) with respect to the nucleolus values yj = τ
∗(r0)
of the players not in U1. Since the nucleolus satisﬁes the Davis-Maschler reduced game
consistency property, the nucleolus values of the reduced game (U1, r1) are equal to the
nucleolus values of the players of U1 in the game (N, r). In iteration k = 1 the algorithm
assigns in Step 2 the value τ∗(r1) to any player j ∈ U1 \ U2. According to Lemma 4.5,
τ∗(r1) is the nucleolus value of the players in U1 \ U2 in the game (U1, r1), and hence it is
also the nucleolus value of these players in the game (N, r). Continuing this reasoning we
have that in any iteration k, the algorithm assigns in Step 2 the value τ ∗(rk) to any player
j ∈ Uk \ Uk+1, which is the nucleolus value of the players in Uk \ Uk+1 in the game (N, r).
At the ﬁnal iteration K we have that UK+1 = {1} and player 1 gets its nucleolus value in
Step 4 of the algorithm. 
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6 Complexity of the algorithm
For arbitrary veto-rich games the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997) to compute the
nucleolus is an exponential time algorithm of the order O(n.2n−1). Branzei et al. (2005)
argue that applying the algorithm to the speciﬁc case of a peer group game the complexity
reduces to a polynomial time algorithm of orderO(n3). They show that the algorithm given
in their paper to ﬁnd the nucleolus of a peer group game is a polynomial time algorithm
of order O(n2). In this section we show that the algorithm given in the previous section to
ﬁnd the nucleolus of the more general restricted game of a game with disjunctive permission
structure is a polynomial time algorithm of order O(n4). We ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of a
good set in a digraph.
Definition 6.1 For a digraph (N,D) with D ∈ DN , a set T ⊂ N is a good set, when
(i) there is a unique top node in the subgraph (T,D(T )) of (N,D) and for any other node
i in T there is a path from this unique top node i that only contains nodes in T ,
(ii) the set N \ T is connected, and
(iii) only the top node in (T,D(T )) has predecessors in N \ T .
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2 In any iteration k of the algorithm, the set Uk \ Uk+1 is a good set.
Proof. Applying Corollary 4.8 to (Uk, Dk) we have that the subgraph of (Uk,Dk) restricted
to Uk\Uk+1 is a connected, acyclic directed graph with one top node, so condition (i) holds.
Next, denote Tk = Uk \Uk+1. Then Uk \Tk = Uk+1. Therefore condition (ii) holds, because
Uk+1 is feasible in (Uk,Dk) and thus connected in (Uk,Dk). Further, by applying the
second statement of Proposition 4.7 to (Uk, Dk) we have that Uk+1 has only one successor
in Tk = Uk \ Uk+1. Let this only successor be node j in Tk. Since the digraph (Uk, Dk) is
acyclic and quasi-strongly connected, there is a path from top node 1 in (Uk, Dk) to any
other node in Uk, so also to any node in Tk. Since j is the only successor of Uk+1 in Tk,
any path from 1 to some node h ∈ Tk must contain the node j. Moreover, the path from
j to h can not contain nodes not in Tk, otherwise Uk+1 has more than one successor in Tk.
Hence j is also a top node in Tk such that for any other node in Tk there is a path from j
to this node that only contains nodes in Tk. 
Lemma 6.2 implies that in Step 2 of the algorithm the set Uk+1 that we must ﬁnd is such
that its complement Uk \ Uk+1 is a good set. Conversely, when Tk is the collection of all
good sets in (Uk, Dk), then the search for Uk+1 can be restricted to sets in the collection
Uk \Tk, Tk ∈ Tk. The next lemma says that in a game with permission structure (N, v,D)
there is precisely one good set for any player j ∈ N . Applying this to (Uk, Dk) this means
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that at iteration k of the algorithm the number of good sets is equal to |Uk|. Observe that
j itself is a singleton good set if j has no successors.
Lemma 6.3 Let (N,D) be a digraph with D ∈ DN . Then for any node j ∈ N there is
exactly one good set T such that j is the unique top node in T .
Proof. Recall from Section 2.3 that the set SD(j) of all complete subordinates of j is the
set of nodes i such that any path from top node 1 in (N,D) to node i contains node j. It
is straightforward to verify that SD(j) is a good set having node j as its unique top node.
Next, suppose that there are two good sets with j as their unique top node, say T1 and
T2 and, w.l.o.g., suppose that T1 \ T2 is non-empty. Consider some node h ∈ T1 \ T2. By
deﬁnition of a good set we know that any path from top player 1 to the player h contains
the node j. However, N \ T2 does not contain j and so there is no path from top node 1
to h in N \ T2, contradicting condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 6.1. 
We are now ready to consider the complexity of the algorithm.
Proposition 6.4 The complexity of the algorithm is of order O(n4).
Proof. First, in iteration k we have to ﬁnd all good sets in Uk. To ﬁnd the good set with
some player j in Uk as its unique top node, delete player j from Uk. Then the good set
consists of player j and all nodes in Uk that are no longer connected to player 1 when player
j is deleted. Since Uk contains at most n − 1 nodes not equal to 1, this requires at most
O(n2) actions to ﬁnd the good set of node j. So, it requires at most O(n3) actions to ﬁnd
all n− 1 good sets of all players j = 1. Next, at each iteration k we need to calculate the
number τ (Uk\T, rk) for any good set T . For this we need at most O(n−1)mk actions, where
mk is the number of actions to ﬁnd all values vk(U), U ⊆ Uk in Step 3 of iteration k − 1.
Clearly m0 = 1. Further, from equation (5.10) in Step 3 of the algorithm it follows that we
need mk−1 actions to ﬁnd vk(U) if PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅. Otherwise mk−1 actions are needed
to calculate vk(U) = vk−1(U ∪ (Uk−1 \ Uk)) and O(1) actions are needed for calculating
τ(Uk, rk−1)|Uk−1 \ Uk| and for substraction, because τ(Uk, rk−1) was already found before.
Hence mk = mk−1 + O(1). Together with m0 = 1 this yields that mk ≤ O(n). Since the
number of iterations is at most equal to n, it follows that the complexity of the algorithm
is given by n · (O(n3) +O((n− 1)mk)) = O(n
4). 
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